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POllCE LIABIUTY IN fiGH-SPEED CHASES: FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION OR STATE TORT LAW; WHY THE
SUPREME COURT'S NEW STANDARD LEAVES THE
BURDEN ON THE STATE AND WHAT TIDS MIGHT
MEAN FOR MARYLAND
Law and disorder on the interstate; Chase: At speeds hitting
110 m.p.h., police pursue a carload of bank holdup suspects
from Baltimore, only to lose it in Silver Spring. . .. By the
time police lost the car at the Colesville Road exit in Silver
Spring, officers from eight jurisdictions driving everything
from Ford Crown Victorias to Geo Trackers had joined the
chase. The pursuit "involved anybody and everybody," said
Special Agent Peter A. Gulotta, Jr. of the FBI. Police said
they were amazed that no one was injured and nobody
crashed.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Newspaper headlines make it quite clear; high-speed police
chases are a regular occurrence across the nation. 2 The necessity
1. Peter Hermann et ai., Law and Disorder on the Interstate, THE SUN (BALT.), Sept.

19, 1998, at lA, available in 1998 WL 4985502.
2. In a small study, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reported
that in 1996 there were 108 deaths involving police vehicles. Of the 108
deaths, 18 were police officers, 75 were uninvolved motorists, and 15 were
uninvolved pedestrians. A similar 1997 study reported a total of 104 deaths involving police vehicles. Of the 104 deaths, 25 were police officers, 54 were
uninvolved motorists, and 24 were uninvolved pedestrians. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Motor Vehicle Crash Data from FARS and GES
(visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://www.fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/www/co&selcity
id=o&disp_col=l&showzero=n7>; see also Travis N. Jensen, Note, Cooling the Hot
Pursuit: Toward a Categorical Approach, 73 IND. LJ. 1277, 1279-80 (1998) ("Indeed the motor vehicle has been determined to be the deadliest weapon in
the police arsenal, surpassing even firearms." (citing Geoffrey P. Alpert & Patrick R. Anderson, The Most Deadly Pursuits: Police Pursuits, 3 JUST. Q. 1, 2
(1986». While the numbers of this small study may seem very undaunting, it
only includes deaths and not the larger number of accidents that ended in injury. See Geoffrey P. Alpert et ai., The Constitutional Implications of High-Speed Police Pursuits Under A Substantive Due Process Analysis: Homeward Through the Haze,
27 U. MEM. L. REv. 599, 600 (1997) (noting that "the number of deaths resulting from high-speed pursuits far exceeds the number of deaths caused each
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and effectiveness of police pursuits in modern law enforcement
practice have been the center of vigorous debate 3 at the courthouses and in legislative offices on both the state and federal
levels. 4 The main issue underlying this debate is the liability of police officers, including the localities that employ them, for injuries
to both suspects and bystanders resulting from a high-speed police

year by any other police activity") [hereinafter Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications]. According to one study, 45% of high-speed pursuits result in property damage and 23% cause personal injury. See Phillip M. Pickus, Torts - G0vernment Immunity - Police Officer Owes Duty of Care to Third Parties Injured by the
Fleeing Suspect; Injured Plaintiff Can Recover From State and Political Subdivisions If
Officer Was Negligent in Commencing and Maintaining Pursuit. Boyer v. State, 323
Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121 (1991), 21 u. BALT. L. REv. 363, 363 n.l (1992) (citing
Geoffrey P. Alpert & Roger G. Dunham, Policing Hot Pursuits: The Discovery of
Aleatory Elements, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 528 (1989». Furthermore,
the economic costs of traffic crashes are very high-an average of $150 billion
a year. See Lawrence Blincoe, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, The Economic Cost of
Motor Vehicle Crashes (visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/
economic/ecomveI994.htm7>. Given the substantial economic and societal
costs of high-speed police chases, many commentators question the value of
benefits from such pursuits. "Most research and professional literature concludes that pursuits create far greater risks than benefits to law enforcement
and to the public. In other words, the risk created by vehicular pursuits is
often greater than the need to enforce the law." Alpert et aI., Constitutional
Implications, at 606 (citing Maurice Hannigan, The Viability of Police Pursuits, 59
PoueE CHIEF 46, 48-49 (1992». These trends can be found in Maryland as
well. For example, a six-year study of the Baltimore County police department
reported 1064 pursuits, from which 388 accidents occurred. See Alpert et aI.,
Constitutional Implications, at 612. This amounted to one accident for every 2.7
pursuits. See id. The reasons for these pursuits included traffic offenses (55%),
suspected felonious activity (25%), and reckless or impaired driving (6%). See
id. (citing Thomas Lucadamo, Identifying the Dimension of Police Pursuit
(1984) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Maryland) (on file with Geoffrey Alpert, Andrew C. Clarke, and William C. Smith».
3. See Dennis J. Kenney & Geoffrey P. Alpert, A National Survey of Pursuits and the
Use of Police Force: Data from Law Enforcement Agencies, 25(4) J. CRIM. JUST. 315,
315-23 (1997); see also Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at
604-05. See generally Alpert & Dunham, supra note 2, at 531 (analyzing the relationship between various factors, such as officer's age, duration of chase, number of officers involved, the officer's gender, and the injuries that are incurred as a result of a high-speed chase).
4. See, e.g., Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 604 ("The
United States Congress, several local grand juries, and many other government entities have conducted investigations into the problems associated with
police pursuits. This inquiry has led to reform in policies, training, and supervision of pursuit driving." (citations omitted».
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chase. 5
In the federal courts, this debate resulted in a split among the
circuits as to what, if any, constitutional rights are afforded to a
party recovering from injuries resulting from a high-speed chase,6
and what legal standard should be applied to determine when a police officer is liable for those injuries. 7 The Supreme Court recently
clarified whether the Constitution protects an individual injured
during a high-speed pursuit and delineated the proper standard for
police liability to be applied in police pursuit cases. 8 While the Supreme Court has spoken, there is still considerable room for the
states, depending on their particular political and social climates, to
fashion their own tort remedies as they see fit. 9
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

Cf County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998) (stating the issue
as "whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a
suspected offender"); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1299-1302 (3d
Cir. 1993) (en banc) (determining the standard for liability when a vehicle
that was not involved with the chase was hit by a vehicle driven by the fleeing
suspect); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 717-18 (4th Cir.
1991) (inquiring into the liability of a police officer where an innocent driver
was struck by both the vehicle of the fleeing suspect and the police officer
pursuing him). See generally Roger W. Kirst, Constitutional Rights of Bystanders in
the War on Crime, 28 N.M. L. REv. 59, 68-77 (1998) (discussing the need for
constitutional protection for bystanders injured during the course of a highspeed chase); Mitchell J. Edlund, Note, In the Heat of the Chase: Determining
Substantive Due Process Violations Within the Framework of Police Pursuits When an
Innocent Bystander is Injured, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 161, 162-68 (1995) (suggesting
a lower level of culpability for injured bystanders under substantive due process).
See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part III.C; see also, e.g., Alpert et al., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2? at 626-61 (discussing the various pre-Lewis approaches
taken by the circuits and commenting, "[b]ecause the 'shocks the conscience'
standard is an incoherent and unattainable standard for both litigants and
courts, the Authors conclude that in high-speed pursuit cases under a substantive due process analysis, courts should apply the clearer and more concise
'deliberate and reckless indifference' standard").
See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-56. For a detailed discussion of Lewis, see infra Part
II.D.
See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848 (stating that the constitutional concept of "conscience-shocking" duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault, but
points either clearly away from liability or toward liability at the end of the
tort law spectrum). Federal courts are reluctant to constitutionalize state tort
law. See Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1041 n.9 (1st Cir. 1996). One commentator has suggested that, "[a]lthough plaintiffs have been somewhat successful
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This Comment sets forth the various considerations an attorney
must account for when analyzing issues of police liability arising out
of a high-speed chase.lO Through the framework that is developed
by this Comment, an attorney will be better equipped to make the
early tactical decisions that can determine the outcome of a case.
Part II of this Comment examines the debate over liability for police actions, including the policy considerations and actors frequently involved. II Part III of this Comment will address the applicable federal statutory and constitutional provisions and provide
relevant case law for each. 12 Part IV will discuss the applicable Maryland law and examine its importance in obtaining recovery for a client injured during a high-speed police chase. 13 Finally, Part V navigates the web of Maryland law, suggesting areas of possible police
liability that better balances individual compensation with law enforcement's need to ensure the safety of the public. 14 Notwithstanding a high bar to recovery for plaintiffs injured during high-speed
police pursuits, this Comment concludes that state law should be
considered a viable avenue of recovery to serve both the interests of
the state and of the injured parties. 15
II. THE INTERESTS AND POLICIES IMPLICATED BY THE DEBATE OVER LIABILITY FOR A POLICE OFFICER'S ACTIONS
The debate surrounding the potential liability of officers, police
departments, and municipalities to individuals who are injured 16 as

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

in litigating pursuit claims on negligence grounds, judicial hostility to constitutional claims [still] runs high." Michael Avery, Police Chases: More Deadly
Than a Speeding Bullet?, 33 TRIAL 52, 53 (Dec. 1997).
See infra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 58-150 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 174-95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836-37 (1998) (injured suspect); Boveri v. Town of Saugus, 113 F.3d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (injured driver
of an uninvolved vehicle); Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1035 (1st Cir. 1996)
(injured pedestrian); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045, 1046 (7th Cir. 1996) (injured driver of uninvolved vehicle); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296,
1300 (3d Cir. 1994) (injured suspects and bystanders); Webber v. Mefford, 43
F.3d 1340, 1342 (10th Cir. 1994) (injured bystanders); Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1494 (10th Cir. 1992) (injured bicyclist); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 717-18 (4th Cir. 1991) (injured driver of
uninvolved vehicle); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1103 (6th Cir. 1987) (injured driver of uninvolved vehicle); Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947, 948 (11th
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a result of a high-speed chase invariably invokes competing interests
and policies. 17 A police officer can incur liabilityl8 either by intentionally stopping a fleeing suspect l9 or by maintaining a pursuit that
ends in an accident. 20 Bystanders are frequently injured during a
police officer's pursuit of a fleeing suspect21 when their automobiles
collide with either the officer's or the suspect's automobile, or when
they are simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, also increasing the potential liability at issue. 22

A. Competing Policies and Standards
The debate over the potential liability of police officers, police
departments, and municipalities bears significant policy considerations to be addressed and eventually balanced. 23 The competing pol-

17.

18.

19.
20.
21.
22.

23.

Cir. 1986) (injured driver of uninvolved vehicle); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d
534, 535 (5th Cir. 1985) (i~ured suspect); Frye v. Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp.
1320, 1321-22 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (injured suspect); Britt v. Little Rock Police
Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189, 190 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (injured driver of uninvolved vehicle).
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the International Association of Chiefs of Police define qpolice pursuit" as an event that is initiated when a law enforcement officer, operating an authorized emergency vehicle, gives notice to stop (either through the use of visual or audible
emergency signals or a combination of emergency devices) to a motorist who
the officer is attempting to apprehend, and the motorist fails to comply with
the signal by either maintaining his or her speed, increasing speed, or taking
other evasive action to elude the officer's continued attempts to stop the motorist. See Traffic Law Enforcement Planner, Pursuit Policy (visited Sept. 5,
1999) <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov /people/ outreach/safesobr / 16qp/pursuit.html>.
It should be noted that the police officer may incur liability personally or in
an official capacity. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I1I.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See generally Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 717-19 (4th
Cir. 1991) (discussing police liability where an innocent driver was severely injured when hit by the vehicles of the suspect and the officer in pursuit); Jeffrey M. Epstein, Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act for Injuries Sustained
During Police Pursuits, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 356, 36().61 (1994) (analyzing bystander injury cases); Mark A. Mesler II, Note, When an Innocent Bystander Who
is Injured l7y a Police Officer Can Recover Under Section 1983, 25 U. MEM. L. REv.
781, 794-800 (1995) (examining cases where innocent bystanders have been
injured).
See Alpert et ai., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 602 ("On the one
hand, if many restrictions are placed on police use of deadly force, the public
may be endangered because dangerous persons will escape immediate appre-
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icy considerations discussed herein tend to arise in tandem with
concerns over police practices that pose a risk to the public. 24 Given
the dangers posed by high-speed chases, especially through heavily
populated areas, the appropriate amount of deference to police discretion becomes the central issue around which the debate swirlS.25
For analytical convenience, there are two key public policy perspectives to consider-pro-police and public safety.
1.

Pro-Police

The major policy concern undermining the argument to increase police liability is the fear of hampering effective law enforcement. 26 Particularly in times of high crime rates and societal disgust
with criminal activity,27 there is an enormous fear that imposing too
much liability on law enforcement officials will have a severe chilling effect on successful law enforcement efforts. 28 There is a belief
that once the police officer must consider the possible civil consequences of a hot pursuit, wrongdoers will gain an undesirable incentive to flee. 29
The pro-police perspective is a natural outgrowth of the common-law doctrine of governmental immunity.30 Governmental immu-

24.

25.
26.

27.

28.
29.
30.

hension. Alternatively, insufficient control of the use of deadly force may result in needless killings in a community.").
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 533 U.S. 833, 853 (1998). In discussing the
police officer's decision-making process, the Court recognizes the balance between the need to stop a suspect, and the need to protect the public from a
high-speed threat. See id. See generally Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications,
supra note 2, at 604-06 (discussing police pursuits and reform measures).
See Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 606.
See Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1037-38 (1st Cir. 1996). The court stressed
that a finding of liability would "hamstring the police in their performance of
vital duties." !d. at 1038. Not eager for such a result, the court declined to judicially promulgate law enforcement decisions; this would simply create too
much interference. See id.; see also Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th
Cir. 1995) ("Holding police officers liable for every injurious consequence of
their actions would paralyze the functions of law enforcement.").
In recent years, the national violent crime rate has actually declined. See, e.g.,
Crime at Lowest in Decades, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1998, at All, availabk in 1998
WL 22543569.
See Evans, 100 F.3d at 1037-38. The Evans court observed that police chases are
"a necessary concomitant of maintaining order in our modern society." Id.
See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507, 397
A.2d 1027, 1030 (1979) ("[The doctrine of governmental immunity] is presently viewed as a rule of policy which protects the State from burdensome interference with its governmental functions and preserves its control over State
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nity is based on the premise that the State must be protected from
litigants or be severely hindered in its governmental functions. 3!
This belief resonates even today.32 Unless the Maryland General Assembly statutorily creates an exception to governmental immunity,
the State shall escape liability.33 While some legislative enactments
may chip away the protection of governmental immunity, the propolice policy perspective is often served, in that statutes often limit
the damages that can be awarded and prevent litigants from fully
accessing the pockets of the State. 34 While this type of legislation
waives the State's immunity in limited situations, it still fosters a propolice policy by preserving the ability of police officers to perform
their day-to-day functions without fear of personal liability.35

31.

32.

33.
34.
35.

agencies and funds." (citing Godwin v. County Comm'rs of St. Mary's County,
256 Md. 326, 333, 260 A.2d 295, 298-99 (1970); Baltimore v. State, 173 Md.
267,271, 195 A. 571, 573-74 (1937); State v. Wingert, 132 Md. 605, 611, 104 A.
117, 119-20 (1918); State v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 34 Md. 344 (1871),
aff'd, 88 U.S. 456 (1875»).
See id.; see also Godwin, 256 Md. at 332, 260 A.2d at 298 ("The immunity is said
to rest upon public policy; ... reluctance to divert public funds to compensate private injuries; and the inconvenience and embarrassment which would
descend upon the government if it should be subject to such liability.").
See Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 55,405 A.2d 255, 257 (1979); see
also Town of Brunswick v. Hyatt, 91 Md. App. 555, 565, 605 A.2d 620, 625
(1992) ("The Court concluded that to take the protection of governmental
immunity away from the municipality would have a chilling effect on the municipality's willingness to provide this most vital and substantial public service." (discussing Mayor of Baltimore City v. State ex rel. Blueford, 173 Md.
267,273, 195 A.2d 571, 574-75 (1937»). Specifically in regard to § 1983, limited immunity may protect an officer against the threat of individual recovery;
as explained by one writer: "Under qualified immunity, state and local officials who perform their executive and administrative functions without violating clearly established laws are protected against § 1983 monetary liability in
their personal capacities." Edlund, supra note 5, at 177 (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); Harlow v. Fitzsimmons, 457 U.S. 800, 807
(1982); Butz v. Economou, 38 U.S. 478, 508 (1978».
See Austin, 286 Md. at 55, 405 A.2d at 257.
See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(b) (1998) ("State personnel are
immune from suit in courts of this State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State
personnel .... "). For a further discussion of governmental immunity, see infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
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Public Safety

Contrary to the pro-police perspective lies the belief that too
much discretion afforded to police officers with lower risk of liability creates an overwhelming threat to the safety of the general public. 36 This idea is based on the notion that effective law enforcement
need not entail high-speed chases that place the general public's
lives and liberties at riskY While the law must protect public coffers
and the ability of governmental actors to efficiently do their job, it
must also afford an avenue of resolution for dispute and collection
of damages. 38 Notwithstanding the policy argument that a state must
protect itself from excessive litigation, the acts of its agents may
nonetheless result in injuries to a constituent it has avowed to protect. 39 This shortcoming is especially exacerbated when individuals
from outside the state are injured by a government agent, representative, or employee working within another state. 40 In such a scenario, not even the democratic forces can protect this individual's interests. 41 Therefore, from a public safety perspective, governmental
immunity leaves governmental actors with essentially unfettered discretion, promoting unreasonable behavior and leaving the actors
without any fear of the possible repercussions from their daily
decisions.
Generally, both sides of the coin come into play in any police
36. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 865 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Joseph Finarelli, Feature, High-speed Chases and Section 1983: Why
a Definitive Liability Standard May Not Matter, 66 DEF. COUNSEL j. 238, 246
(1999) ("Certain risks of potential harm inhere in driving streets and highways. In police pursuits, high-speeds, aggressive driving, and the obsession
with escape or apprehension to the exclusion of concern for others all
heighten the basic risks. This combination is a potentially lethal cocktail.").
37. See Tim Crimmond, Police Pursuits: Traveling a Collision Course, POUCE CHIEF,
July 1993, at 43, 47. This inconsistency is especially glaring because it is the
authority of a democratic government that the police officer is exercising
when injuring a suspect or innocent bystander. See Edlund, supra note 5, at
217 (advocating the adoption of the "deliberate indifference" standard and
reasoning that deliberately indifferent "pursuits entail an abuse of police powers that are uniquely bestowed upon a police officer and which entail grave
risks when exercised").
38. See Austin, 286 Md. at 81-83, 405 A.2d at 272 (Cole, j., dissenting) (urging Maryland to adopt a rule which allows tort recovery from the State).
39. See id. at 83, 405 A.2d at 272 (Cole, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 62, 405 A.2d at 261.
41. See id. at 78, 405 A.2d at 269 (Cole, J., dissenting) (noting that recovery would
occur had the State not been a party).
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pursuit litigation or legislation. 42 These broad policy concerns
should be the underlying theme of any argument for or against police liability. Yet, to appreciate the interaction of these opposing
policy considerations, the practitioner must begin with the most
fundamental questions for claims of recovery: from whom and
under what causes of action mayan injured plaintiff recover?

B.

The Potential Defendants

There are two principal defendants who may be implicated by
injuries resulting from a high-speed chase; one is the actual officer
involved in the chase, the other is the municipality for whom the
officer works. 43
1.

Police Officer

When a police officer is acting under color of law, the officer
can be held liable individually44 if the officer's actions violate a citizen's constitutional rights. 45 Likewise, in a state tort action, the of42. See also Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 601 (" [The
topic of liability for high-speed pursuits], like many in the substantive due
process area, has serious undertones and reflects major policy concerns of
state and local governments throughout this country.").
43. See, e.g., Nicole G. Tell, Note, Representing Police Officers and Municipalities: A
Conflict of Interest For a Municipal Attorney in a § 1983 Police Misconduct Suit, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 2825, 2830-31 (1997).
44. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) ("Personal capacity suits ... seek to
impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under
color of state law. Thus, '[0] n the merits, to establish personal liability ... it
is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused a
deprivation of a federal right.'" (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
166 (1985»). Personal capacity suits can be brought against any governmental
agent, regardless of whether they work for a state, county, or municipal
agency. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 537 (1986)
(addressing a personal capacity suit against local district school board members); Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 482 (2d Cir. 1995) (deciding a claim
against various state prison officials in their personal capacities); Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (analyzing a claim
against an Illinois state trooper in his personal capacity).
45. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1998) (litigating a First
Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983); Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522
U.S. 75, 78 (1997) (Due Process and Equal Protection); Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 268 (1994) (substantive due process); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489
U.S. 593, 594 (1989) (Fourth Amendment); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 115 (1988) (First Amendment and Due Process); Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (explaining that before any § 1983 liability there must be the commission of some constitutional tort); Fagan v. City
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ficer may be sued personally for injuries incurred while the officer
is acting in a wanton or recklessly negligent manner.46
2.

Municipality

If the police officer is not sued individually, but rather sued in
an official capacity,47 then the city or county that employs the officer may be liable for any damages. 48 In addition to finding the ofof Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating the issue as whether
there has been a clear constitutional violation committed on the individual in
custody); Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that under § 1983 there must be a well-established violation of a constitutional right).
46. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
47. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (stating that officialcapacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent"). As long as the government
entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit
is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.
See id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55). It is noteworthy that a finding of
blameworthiness on the part of the government official still plays a pivotal
role in prosecuting a successful claim against the municipality. See City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 797-99 (1986) (per curiam). According to the
Heller Court: "If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of
the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might
have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the
point." [d. at 799 (emphasis added).
48. See Monel~ 436 U.S. at 690 (concluding that municipalities and local government units are subject to liability under § 1983 if the implementation of their
policies causes constitutional injury); Edlund, supra note 5, at 172. From a
practical perspective, the municipality is likely to be the most promising avenue of recovery, in that "most police officers do not have the financial capacity to satisfy a sizeable judgment, ... unless the municipality indemnifies the
officer." Edlund, supra note 5, at 172 (citing SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CML LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 1.03 (2d ed. 1986». Yet, neither a
state nor its governmental officials acting in their official capacities are subject
to a § 1983 suit for money damages. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a state nor its officials are "persons" under § 1983); see also Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under § 1983:
Municipal Liability for State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1503, 1531
(1999) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment precludes the imposition of
money damages from a state treasury under federal law). However, they can
be the subject of a § 1983 claim for injunctive relief. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71
n.lO ("Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for
injunctive relief, would be a person under section 1983 because 'officialcapacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the
State.''' (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
159-60 (1908»).
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ficer liable, the plaintiff must also show that a citizen's constitutional rights were violated while the officer was acting in accordance
with a formal policy or custom of the municipality.49 This form of liability is not a respondeat superior theory; rather, the police officer's actions must be based on policies or customs of the entity.50
Additionally, the municipality's liability is premised on clearly establishing the officer's underlying constitutional violation. 51 Therefore,
for any action brought under federal law, a prerequisite to any
high-speed chase litigation is the identification of the constitutional
source for the underlying claim.52
Just as there are several potential defendants, there are multiple sources of potential relief for litigants attempting to recover
damages incurred as a result of a high-speed police pursuit. Issues
arising out of a high-speed chase can be litigated under state or federal law. 53 With the recent Supreme Court opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,54 absent egregious, intentional police conduct, a
49. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 783 (1997) ("If the sheriff's actions constitute county 'policy,' then the county is liable for them."); Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 n.6 (1992). The Collins Court
stated that the proper analysis of a § 1983 claim against the municipality requires an inquiry into "(I) whether plaintiffs harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation." Collins, 503 U.S. at 120.
50. See Monel~ 436 U.S. at 693-94. The Court stated that:
[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution
of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.
[d. at 694. In fact, a municipality can be liable only if it acts in some way to
cause the claimed constitutional violation. See id.
51. See supra note 45; see also Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716,
724 (4th Cir. 1991) (establishing that a claim of inadequate training on the
part of the municipality as a supervisory authority cannot be made out unless
the officers were themselves found to have committed a constitutional
wrong); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1990) (dismissing claims
against the Mayor and Chief of Police where there was no showing that the
individual officers committed a constitutional violation).
52. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) ("The first step in any [§ 1983]
claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed." (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 140 (1979»).
53. See infra Parts II, III.
54. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
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Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process allegation will faiI.55
Therefore, the possibility of filing a claim under state law becomes
an essential alternative. 56 While the standards differ among states,57
this Comment will focus on the laws that would affect litigants and
practitioners in Maryland courts. 58

III. THE FEDERAL STANDARD

A.

Civil Rights Protection Under § 1983

When a person injured by the conduct of a government official
wishes to bring a claim in federal court, the general practice is to
allege a violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 59 Section 1983 creates a
civil cause of action against persons who violate federal constitu55. See id. at 848 n.8. For a discussion of substantive due process actions brought
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 85-150 and accompanying text.
56. See Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 601 ("Innocent
third parties, who are injured during high-speed pursuits, may seek recovery
under either state law or under federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.");
Jensen, supra note 2, at 1282-90 (noting and arguing the inadequacy of both §
1983 and state law actions to redress an injured bystander's injuries).
57. Almost all states offer some legislatively enacted tort liability scheme for specific acts committed by governmental officials in the scope of their employment. See, e.g., Jeremy D. Arkin, Note, Police Chase the Bad Guys, and Plaintiffs
Chase the Police: Young v. Woodall and the Standard of Care for Officers in Pursuit,
75 N.C. L. REv. 2468 (1997) (providing an overview of North Carolina's tort
law relating to police pursuit).
58. See infra Part III.
59. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Congress enacted § 1983 as a means of enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 351 n.3 (1979)
(Brennan, j., concurring).
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tional or statutory rights60 while acting "under color of state law. "61
The requirement that a person act "under color of state law" has
been defined as the exercise of power "possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law. "62
In addition to conduct resulting from action by a government
officer, the plaintiff seeking recovery under § 1983 must also
demonstrate a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory
right. 63 Failure to meet the more-specifIc-provision rule 64 may result
60. See Edlund, supra note 5, at 169 ("It is abundantly clear that § 1983 was
adopted to address the failure of certain states to enforce their own laws with
an even hand." (citing District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 426
(1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961}}); Comment, ActionaUility
of Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
533, 549 (1978).
61. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 536 U.S. 687, 722
(1999) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia commented that:
Section 1983 establishes a unique, or at least, distinctive, cause of action, in that the legal duty which is the basis for relief is ultimately
defined not by the c1aim-creating statute itself, but by an extrinsic
body of law to which the statute refers, namely "federal rights elsewhere conferred."
[d. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3
(1979}). There are three essential sources that provide extensive coverage of §
1983 and litigating claims involving police officers. See MICHAEL AVERY ET AL.,
POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION (3d ed. 1998); 1 SHELDON H.
NAHMOD, CML RiGHTS AND CML LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAw OF SECTION
1983 (4th ed. 1997); 1-2 ISIDORE SILVER, POLICE CML LIABILITY (1986 rev. ed.
1999).
62. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). The "under color of state
law" requirement of § 1983 has been thought to be essentially akin to the
Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement. See United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); see also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 935 (1982) (holding that when the challenged conduct constitutes state
action, the conduct also constitutes color of state law).
63. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). In Parmtt, the Court stated:
[I]n any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the
two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (I) whether
the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under
color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States.
[d. at 535; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998)
("As in any action under section 1983, the first step is to identify the exact
contours of the underlying right said to have been violated." (citing Graham
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in the quick dismissal of any § 1983 claim based purely on substantive due process. 65 Obviously, this outcome is not desirable. However, before County of Sacramento v. LewiS,66 plaintiffs struggled with
the question of what constitutional right enabled injured parties to
recover for injuries sustained during a high-speed chase. In police
pursuit litigation, a claim arises under one of two principal constitutional provisions: (1) the Fourth Amendment as a seizure;67 or (2)
the Fourteenth Amendment as a claim under the more generalized,
implied notions of substantive due process. 68

B.

Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment?

1.

Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures69 and must be applied to police conduct
in effectuating arrests, investigatory stops, and seizures. 7o If the conduct of the officers intentionally terminates the suspect's freedom of
movement during a police pursuit, then a seizure has occurred;
therefore, any claim arising from this seizure would be properly an-

64.

65.

66.
67.
68.
69.

70.

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989))); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140
(1979) ("The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff
has been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and Laws.'''); 1
NAHMOD, supra note 61, §§ 2:2 to :45.
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. The more specific-provision rule is a doctrine of
constitutional interpretation that favors the use of an explicit textual source
over an amorphous substantive due process approach that lacks guideposts to
gauge a claim. See id. at 394-95; see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
272 (1997) ("Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered
by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.").
See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 84245 (rationalizing substantive due process claims when
there has been no other cognizable constitutional violation).
For a discussion of Lewis, see infra notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
The Fourth Amendment assures that" [t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The Court explained that:
"[A]II claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force - deadly
or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a
free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process' approach."
Id.
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alyzed under the Fourth Amendment. 71 Generally, a seizure involves
some intentional effort by the officer to terminate a suspect's or bystander's freedom of movement. 72 In determining whether a seizure
71. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989) (finding a seizure
where the police officers set up a roadblock by placing an 18-wheel truck in
the path of a fleeing suspect, which ultimately resulted in an accident); Latta
v. Keryte, 118 F.3d 693, 696, 699 (lOth Cir. 1997) (explaining that a fleeing
suspect was seized when he stopped for a two-car roadblock that the police
had set up to prevent him from traveling any further on the interstate);
Seekamp v. Michaud, 109 F.3d 802, 804-06 (1st Cir. 1997) (acknowledging a
Fourth Amendment seizure when state troopers set up a flatbed tractor-trailer
loaded with lumber across the southbound traffic lanes of the highway and
other tractor-trailers along the shoulder of the highway into which the plaintiff crashed); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 948-49 (7th Cir.
1994) (concluding that a Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred when a
police officer intentionally backed his cruiser into the path of a fleeing motorcyclist and caused a collision that resulted in the rider's death); Adams v. St.
Lucie County Sheriff's Dep't, 962 F.2d 1563, 1565, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 998 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1993) (recognizing a Fourth Amendment seizure
occurred when a police officer intentionally slammed into a fleeing vehicle to
halt its flight); Campbell v. White, 916 F.2d 421, 421-23 (7th Cir. 1990) (observing that no Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred when a police officer unintentionally struck the plaintiff after his motorcycle slid out onto the
median and he had started to walk back onto the highway); Estate of Story v.
McDuffie County, 929 F. Supp. 1523, 1527 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (stating that no
seizure had occurred where the plaintiff's vehicle had crashed while going
around a curve but had never been touched by the pursuing officer's vehicle); Johnson v. Grob, 928 F. Supp. 889, 889-95 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (construing
the police officer's actions as a Fourth Amendment seizure when their roadblock caused the plaintiff to put her vehicle in reverse, slam into a parked
car, and flip her car over); Wozniak v. Cavender, 875 F. Supp. 526, 530, 533
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that no Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred
when the pursuing officers maintained a distance of one to three car lengths
and the injured plaintiff ultimately ended up wrecking his all-terrain vehicle
in a ditch due to driver error); Carroll v. Borough of State College, 854 F.
Supp. 1184, 1191-92 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (announcing that no seizure had occurred where a motorcyclist was injured when he failed to negotiate a turn
and the pursuing officer had merely followed with sirens flashing but made
no attempts to halt his flight); Montgomery v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp.
1253, 1255-57 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (concluding that a Fourth Amendment
seizure had not occurred when the police had merely given chase and the
fleeing suspect had run off the road, crashing into a telephone pole).
72. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97.
It is clear, . . . that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur
whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual's freedom of movement (the innocent passerby), nor even whenever there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired termination of an individual's freedom of movement (the fleeing felon),
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has taken place, it is critical that "a person be stopped by the very
instrumentality [that the officer] set in motion or put in place, in
order to achieve that result."73 Additionally, if a seizure has occurred, then it must be shown that the officer's actions made it unreasonable. 74 This is a lower burden 75 that provides an ideal constitutional ground for challenging police conduct,76 as Fourth
Amendment claims are analyzed under a reasonableness standard.?7
Unfortunately, arguing that a seizure occurred during a police pursuit is often frivolous if there is no intentional police contact with
the suspect or bystander; accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment
becomes an essential tool for attacking an officer's conduct during
a police pursuit. 78

73.

74.

75.

76.
77.
78.

but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of
movement through means intentionally applied.
Id. (emphasis added). The fact that a seizure requires an intentional termination of movement exemplifies the necessity of substantive due process and
state tort law in situations where a bystander or uninvolved motorist is unintentionally injured during a police chase. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844 (holding
that the Fourth Amendment does not govern in cases of an attempted
seizure); Epstein, supra note 22, at 360-61 (contrasting the Fourth Amendment
standard with the Fourteenth Amendment in police pursuit cases). But see
Kirst, supra note 5, at 110-13 (advocating the adoption of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard in cases where uninvolved bystanders are injured because of a high-speed police chase).
Brower, 489 U.S. at 599 ("It was enough here, therefore, that, according to the
allegations of the complaint, Brower was meant to be stopped by the physical
obstacle of the roadblock and that he was so stopped.").
See Campbell v. White, 916 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Absent a seizure, a
discussion of the reasonableness of [an officer's] actions would be merely academic.").
The reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment is a less demanding
burden than the "shocks the conscience" standard that is now applied in
Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Compare Graham, 90 U.S. at 399 ("[T]he
'reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the
question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation."), with Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-49 (holding that an
intent to harm must be shown for an actionable Fourteenth Amendment
claim).
See supra note 65.
By its own terms, the language of the Fourth Amendment mandates a reasonableness inquiry. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
See Mesler, supra note 22, at 801-05 (advocating a Fourth Amendment analysis
in bystander cases while realizing in practice that most claims will fall under
substantive due process); if. Alpert et ai., Constitutional Implications, supra note
2, at 660-62 (arguing the necessity of a lower standard under substantive due
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Fourteenth Amendment1 9

The Fourteenth Amendment contains substantive rights not
enumerated. 80 It is well established that: "the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent government
from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression."81 The Due Process Clause has been interpreted as a limitation on a state actor's power to act arbitrarily and is not a blanket
safeguard for protected interests. 82 Deprivations of due process arise
from conduct that is the result of some deliberate action on the
part of a governmental officiaP3
process in order to allow recovery in police pursuit cases).
79. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
reads in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
80. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) (holding that a
law forbidding contraceptive use by married couples violates the right to privacy implied in the Fourteenth Amendment); see also David H. Armistead, Substantive Due Process Limits on Public Officials' Power to Terminate State-Created Pr0perty Interests, 29 GA. L. REv. 769, 773 (1995) (characterizing due process as
"one of the most important protectors of individual rights not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution"); Edlund, supra note 5, at 179; Franklin J.
Whittlesey, Casenote, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment-Substantive Due Process-Malicious Prosecution Does not Constitute a Deprivation of Liberty Actionabk as
a Constitutional Tort Pursuant to the Due Process Clause-Albright v. Oliver, 114 S.
Ct. 807 (1994),5 SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 269, 277 (1994).
81. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (quoting DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (quoting
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986»); see, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 313, 321-32 (1991)
(discussing the traditional role of substantive due process as a deterrent to
government misconduct).
82. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
83. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (deliberately destroying
an inmate's property); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653, 673-74 (1977)
(disciplining a student); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (pumping a suspect's stomach for drugs); see also Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Study in
Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substantive Due Process Protection Against Excessive
Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 27 Hous. L. REv. 399, 413 (1990)
("Due process, said the Court, is concerned with 'deliberate' decisions by
state officials that constitute an 'abuse of power.''' (quoting Daniels v. Wil-
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The protections invoked by a procedural due process claim,
which address the adequacy of notice and hearing before a state
deprivation of life, liberty, or property,84 are distinguishable from
the rights protected by substantive due process. 85 Substantive due
process is actionable as a direct challenge to certain government
conduct, regardless of the government's satisfaction of notice and
hearing requirements. 86 The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the substantive rights of the Due Process Clause extend
beyond any requirement of fair procedure-substantive due process
protects a broader scope of interests than procedural due process. 87
Iiams, 474 U.S. 327,331-32 (1986»).
84. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7
(1972); Matthew S. Buttacavoli, Casenote, Must Post-Termination Procedural Due
Process Include a Full, Trial-like Evidentiary Hearing? A Critique of Townsel v. San
Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd., 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1109, 1114 (1999) (citing
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 223,233 (1863»).
85. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 61, § 3.55; 1 SILVER, supra note 61, § 8A.06[8] ("The
function of substantive due process as promulgated by Rochin is to serve as a
constitutional 'catch-all' for egregious misconduct which cannot be characterized as a violation of a specific constitutional right. ").
86. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 48, § 3.55; see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. RoTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 13.1, at 510-11 (5th ed. 1995) (elaborating on
the difference between the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process
and procedural due process protections).
87. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 528 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (explaining that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects certain areas of protected liberties);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 84648 (1992)
(delineating the differences between the procedural and substantive protections of the Fourteenth Amendment); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 125-28 (1992) (explaining the care with which substantive due process claims must be handled because of the lack of clear guideposts for judicial interpretation). Noted constitutional law scholars, John E. Nowak and
Ronald D. Rotunda, have commented:
By "substantive review" we mean the judicial determination of the
compatibility of the substance of a law or governmental action with
the Constitution. The Court is concerned with the constitutionality of
the underlying rule [or executive action] rather than with the fairness of the process by which the government applies the rule to an
individual . . . . The concept the Court employs to control the substance of legislation under the due process clause is that certain types
of lawmaking [or executive action] go beyond any proper sphere of
governmental activity. In short, the Court views the act as incompatible with our democratic system of government and individual liberty.
The judicial premise for this position is that any life, liberty, or property limited by such a law [or executive action] is taken without due
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In the context of liability for injuries attributed to police
chases, the protection of substantive due process is implicated by a
police officer's abuse of power that is "so egregious or outrageous
that no state post-deprivation remedy can adequately serve to preserve a person's constitutional guarantees of freedom from such
conduct."88 A claim is properly analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment as a violation of substantive due process if a police pursuit results in injury and occurs either without any intentional physical control over the suspect or results in harm to an innocent bystander.89 Due to the nature of most police pursuit cases, which
process because the Constitution never granted the government the
ability to pass such a law [or take such an action].
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, infra note 86, § 10.6, at 34647; see also Edlund, supra note
5, at 181 ("Substantive due process rights provide plaintiffs with a broad
residual theory to challenge the root of governmental misconduct." (citing
VINCENT R FONTANA, MUNICIPAL LIABIUTY: LAw AND PRACTICE § 4.8 (1990»).
Maryland's constitution contains an analogous due process provision-article 24 of the Declaration of Rights-which also contains a substantive component. See Branch v. McGeeney, 123 Md. App. 330, 352, 718 A.2d 631, 642
(1998) ("[The federal due process] clause is generally interpreted as being synonymous with article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights." (citing
Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 483, 13 A.2d 763, 768 (1940»). In addition, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the substantive component embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment provides authoritative guidance to the interpretation of article 24. See Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 27, 410 A.2d
1052, 1056 (1980); City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 15, 136 A.2d 852,
854-55 (1957); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 686, 7 A.2d
176, 178 (1939).
88. Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991).
89. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1998) (stating that
the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper provision from which to challenge
the conduct of a police officer during a high-speed chase of a motorcycle and
a passenger that was chased for several miles and followed closely, but never
seized); On ossian v. Block, 175 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999) (employing a
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis where a fleeing "muscle car"
was never touched by the pursuing officers and crashed into an uninvolved
motorist); Boveri v. Town of Saugus, 113 F.3d 4, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1997) (examining
a chase under the Fourteenth Amendment where the police officers stayed
several car lengths behind the fleeing suspect's vehicle, which did not stop
until it eventually hydroplaned into an uninvolved motorist); Evans v. Avery,
100 F.3d 1033, 1036 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that absent a seizure, those injured
during a police pursuit may prosecute a § 1983 claim under substantive due
process); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045, 104647 (7th Cir. 1996) (analyzing a
Fourteenth Amendment claim brought against a police officer where there
was no contact between the officer's and the suspect's vehicles and the suspect's vehicle came to a stop after striking an uninvolved motorist); Fagan v.
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generally do not involve an unreasonable Fourth Amendment
seizure,9o substantive due process becomes the central focus for recovery. While the Fourteenth Amendment's value as a vehicle for recovery is not questioned, the standard for judging the egregiousness
of the police officer's actions has been far from clear. Therefore, a
discussion of each of the differing standards that have been applied
III Fourteenth Amendment cases is germane.
C.

The Substantive Due Process Split Among the Circuits

Analyzing a growing number of police pursuit cases as potential
violations of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, the
federal circuit courts split as to the appropriate level of culpability
necessary to impose liability.91 The result was the application of two
City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1299-1301, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (examining a Fourteenth Amendment case where the police chased a speeding
Camaro throughout a city and nearby residential neighborhood before it ran
a red light and plowed into the side of a pickup truck); Temkin v. Frederick
County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 717-19 (4th Cir. 1991) (evaluating a highspeed chase under the Fourteenth Amendment where the fleeing suspect's vehicle sideswiped an uninvolved motorist's vehicle without having any contact
with the pursuing police vehicle); Pleasant v. Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272, 276 n.2
(6th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a substantive due process analysis is preserved
for those actions of a police officer other than a seizure); Feist v. Simonson,
36 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1139-41, 1144 (N.D. Minn. 1999) (analyzing a bystander
case under the Fourteenth Amendment where a limousine driver was killed
instantly when his car was struck by a fleeing suspect); Corbin v. City of
Springfield, 942 F. Supp. 721, 723, 725 (D. Mass. 1996) (undertaking a Fourteenth Amendment analysis' where an innocent motorist was struck at an intersection by the fleeing suspect's vehicle).
90. An analysis of all the possible implications of a Fourth Amendment seizure in
the police chase context is not within the scope of this Comment. For a brief
discussion of the potential nexus between an officer or municipality's liability
for injuries suffered during a high-speed chase and the Fourth Amendment,
see supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
91. See Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 439 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted) rev'd, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854 (1998) (applying a shocks the conscience test). This was especially troublesome in this
area of the law because:
In the framework of police pursuit situations, police misconduct can
best be kept within constitutional norms by maintaining one clear,
objective standard of liability . . . . The need for a concrete Fourteenth Amendment standard is shown by the confusion within the
lower federal courts and the less than enthusiastic regard many jurists have for substantive due process analysis.
Edlund, supra note 5, at 205. However, it is interesting that the Supreme
Court nonetheless retains the potential to distinguish Fourteenth Amendment
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dissimilar standards: one, the "deliberate" or "reckless indifferent"
standard, that turns on the concerns of public safety and imposes a
lower burden for liability;92 and the other, the "shocks the conscience" standard, a pro-police stance that places an extremely high
bar to an injured plaintiff's claim. 93

1.

"Deliberate" or "Reckless Indifference" Standard

In the recent past,94 some federal circuits adopted a "deliberate" or "reckless indifference" standard that hedges between the
competing policies underlying police pursuit liability-something a
little more than mere negligence, but something less than intentional conduct. 95 To recover under this standard, a plaintiff must

92.

93.

94.

95.

violations during a high-speed chase from violations of an inmate's rights
while incarcerated. See infra note 141.
See, e.g., Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating the standard for substantive due process violations is not clearly established, but suggesting a deliberate indifference approach); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550,
1556 n.7 (lIth Cir. 1994) (rejecting a shocks the conscience standard as inapplicable in civil cases for money damages); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102,
1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying a gross negligence standard); see also Alpert et
ai., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 627-38 (providing a general overview of the circuits that have adopted the deliberate or "reckless indifference"
standard).
See Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1038 (1st Cir. 1996), cm. denied, 520 U.S.
1210 (1997) (adopting a shocks the conscience standard where chase occurred in a highly congested area but lasted no more than two minutes and
never exceeded 50 miles per hour); Williams v. City of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009,
1014-15 (10th Cir. 1996) (adopting a shocks the conscience standard); Fagan
v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308-09 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (adopting
a shocks the conscience standard where multiple police cars pursued a suspect's vehicle through residential neighborhood at speeds reaching 80 miles
per hour); Temkin, 945 F.2d at 719 (adopting a shocks the conscience standard
where a police chase down a narrow, two-lane highway reached speeds of 105
miles per hour); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting
a shocks the conscience standard where pursuit in unmarked police vehicle
reached speeds of 100 miles per hour down Louisiana interstate).
See Finarelli, supra note 36, at 242 (noting that although the deliberate indifference standard "has been applied predominantly in several contexts outside
the high-speed police pursuit context," this standard has been applied to determine liability in police chases within the "last decade or so") (citations
omitted).
See Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that
reckless intent does not require a showing of intent to harm). The court
adopted a reckless indifference standard. See id. In order for the officer to be
liable, it would be sufficient that there was awareness of a known or obvious
risk, substantial enough that there was a high probability that serious harm
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show that the police officer created a dangerous condition and acted with deliberate indifference to subject the plaintiff to a known
or obvious danger.96 Deliberate indifference implies a reckless state
of mind more in tune with mental states under criminal law, rather
than in a tort sense. 97 Such a state of mind requires an element of
actual knowledge or willful blindness to a known impending harm. 98
2.

The "Shocks the Conscience" Standard

The "shocks the conscience" standard establishes a standard of
care somewhere99 between the deliberate indifference standard and
absolute immunity. tOO To shock the conscience, the conduct of the
would follow. See id.
96. See L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1996); Wood v. Ostrander, 879
F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989).
97. See Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 899-900 (citing Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d
953,956 (1st Cir. 1992».
98. See id. For example, in Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, a supervisory officer was
held liable where a patrol officer shot and killed an innocent suspect. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 557, 564 (1st Cir. 1989). In holding the supervisor liable, the court relied on a deliberate indifference standard. See id. at 562. The court explained that this standard had been met
because the supervisor had knowledge of the patrol officer's prior record, received multiple citizen complaints regarding the same officer, and failed to
institute any disciplinary action. See id. at 566.
99. Historically, the shocks the conscience standard has been criticized for its lack
of clarity. See, e.g., Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1407 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Easterbrook, j., concurring) (" [A] 'shocks the conscience' test spurns bright
lines. It spurns rules. It is a vague standard ... inviting all decisionmakers to
consult their sensibilities rather than objective circumstances.").
In the words of one noted commentator:
[T]he "shocks the conscience" standard involves an amorphous and
imprecise inquiry. Further, whose conscience must be "shocked"the judge or the jury? As there is no clear indication as to what constitutes conscience shocking behavior, many circuits have blindly applied this restrictive, but undefinable, standard and denied recovery
for victims of police pursuit accidents. On the other hand, the deliberate or reckless indifference standard is well-known to the law and
capable of easy definition.
Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 661-62.
100. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848 (1998). According to one author, the Supreme
Court's reluctance to expand the parameters of substantive due process convinced at least one court to adopt the shocks the conscience standard in police pursuit cases, regardless of previous case law applying the reckless disregard standard. See Edlund, supra note 5, at 197-98 n.174 (discussing Fagan v.
City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (noting that
the court "cannot ignore the Supreme Court's repeated warnings against an
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police officer must be outrageous or offensive to an individual's
sense of justice. 101 This standard requires a look into the mind of
the police officer. 102 However, this is not the sole inquiry. A proper
analysis also includes any abuse of the officer's official police authority granted to the officer by the government 103 and the degree
of discretion entrusted to police officers in the daily performance of
their duties. 104 To better understand the heightened burden that the
shocks the conscience standard entails, an analysis of a Fourth Circuit case that adopted the standard is particularly appropriate.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
adopted the shocks the conscience standard in a police pursuit in
Temkin v. Frederick County Commissioners. 105 In Temkin, an uninvolved
driver was seriously injured when the car she was driving was hit by
both the suspect's and the pursuing officer's vehicles. 106 After the
district court granted Frederick County's motion for summary judgment,107 the issue of whether the shocks the conscience standard
should be applied to impose liability for Fourteenth Amendment violations was ripe for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. 108
The pursuit in Temkin first began when the officer observed a
car racing out of a gas station and spinning its wheels. 109 During the
chase, the officer heard over his radio that the suspect had stolen
seventeen dollars worth of gas. 110 Both cars reached speeds of 65 to
105 miles per hour on a narrow two-lane highway that traversed
populated areas. lll The suspect lost control of his vehicle on a

101.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

overly generous interpretation of the substantive component of the due process clause" (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992);
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994»).
See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1303-04 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169
(1952) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945»). A recent
opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit provides
an excellent example of conduct that is shocking to the conscience. See Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1998); see also infra note 149.
See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 61, § 3.8-9.
See Rankin v. City of Witchita Falls, 762 F.2d 444, 44748 (5th Cir. 1985).
See id.
945 F.2d 716,720 (4th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 718.
See id. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland specifically
granted summary judgment in regard to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. See id.
See id. at 719-24.
See id.
See id.
See id. At one point, the chase proceeded through a carnival area where cars

162

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 29

curve, striking Temkin's vehicle. 1I2 Then, the pursuing officer hit
Temkin's careening vehicle broadside at approximately sixty miles
per hour.113 Due to the accident, Temkin suffered severe and permanent injuries. 1I4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit approved the district court's adoption of the shocks the conscience
standard.1I5 The court considered whether the officer's conduct was
so shocking that it constituted an abuse of state power, violating
Temkin's substantive due process rights. 1I6 The court held that the
officer's conduct, although "disturbing and lacking in judgment,"ll7
failed to rise to the level of conscience shocking. liB Therefore, the
grant of summary judgment was proper 1l9 because Temkin had
failed to state a cognizable violation of substantive due process. l20
lined both sides of the road. See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 720.
See id.
/d. at 723.
See id. Temkin raised five specific facts in an attempt to show that the officer's
conduct shocked the conscience:
(1) the chase continued for a significant period of time over a ten
mile area; (2) the chase continued at a very high rate of speed; (3)
the chase was initiated because of a minor violation; (4) the police
already had, at a minimum, a partial identification of the license
plate of the suspect vehicle; and (5) the chase violated [a police department order], because [the officer] failed to maintain radio contact with his supervisor throughout.
Id. The on-duty supervisor was responding to another call and did not monitor the pursuing officer's chase, in part because his own radio was inoperative.
See id. at 718.
119. By finding that the pursuing officer had not committed a potential Fourteenth Amendment violation, the court further concluded that Temkin had
similarly failed to make a cognizable claim against the Frederick County Commissioners for inadequate training and supervision. See id. at 723-27.
120. See id. The Temkin court distinguished police pursuits from other scenarios in
which a Fourteenth Amendment violation may be found. According to the
Temkin court, "we do not today address the question of whether the same
[shocks the conscience] standard applies in those cases, such as incarceration
or involuntary foster care, where governmental control over the claimant is
intentional and direct." /d. (citing Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th
Cir. 1988». In Martin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained that "a pretrial detainee makes out a due process violation if
he shows 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.''' Id. at 72 (quoting Martin, 849 F.2d at 871 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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As demonstrated by Temkin, the shocks the conscience standard
is a difficult burden for a plaintiff to meet. Until recently, other cir~
cuits have permitted Fourteenth Amendment claims based on the
lower burden of deliberate indifference. 121 However, the Supreme
Court recently resolved this inconsistency by explicitly adopting the
"shocks the conscience" standard for police pursuit situations and
ending the split among the federal circuits. 122

D. The Supreme Court Announces Its Position on the Standard oj Care Jor
Determining Police Liability in High~speed Pursuits-Actions Speak Louder
Than Words
In County oj Sacramento v. Lewis,123 the Supreme Court set forth
the proper standard for determining when substantive due process
rights have been violated during police pursuit cases l24 by adopting
the shocks the conscience standard. 125 The facts in Lewis illustrate
the heightened burden that the shocks the conscience test places
on the plaintiff in a police pursuit case. 126
Dispatched to break up a fight, an officer arrived at the scene
around 8:30 p.m. and observed a motorcycle with two riders approaching at a high rate of speed. 127 The driver of the motorcycle
was eighteen year old Brian Willard and the passenger was sixteen
year old Philip Lewis. 128 With the assistance of another officer, the
officer attempted to block the motorcycle's path.129 The motorcycle
evaded the officers and sped Off.130 One of the officers took up the
pursuit. 131 The chase lasted for about seventy~five seconds through a
busy residential area, with both parties reaching speeds of 100 miles

121.
122.
123.
124.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

(1976»). The Supreme Court has made a similar distinction between injuries
incurred during police pursuits and injuries flowing from police incarceration. See infra note 141.
See supra Part III.C.l.
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 84647 (1998).
523 U.S. 833 (1998).
See id. at 839. The Court explained that certiorari was granted to resolve the
conflict among the circuits regarding the police pursuit cases under substantive due process. See id.
See id. at 84649.
See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 836-37.
See id. at 837.
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per hour.132
Refusing to back down, the pursuing officer followed the motorcycle at distances as short as 100 feet. 133 The chase ended when
Willard failed to negotiate a tight left turn and his motorcycle
tipped over, ejecting both driver and passenger onto the roadway.l34
Following closely and with little time to react, the officer slammed
on his brakes. 135 He avoided the driver, but ran into Lewis at about
forty miles per hour.136 The impact propelled Lewis approximately
seventy feet down the road and inflicted serious injuries to his
body.137 Lewis died at the scene. 138

Mter initially rejecting a Fourth Amendment analysis,139 the
Court determined the appropriateness of the substantive due process claim. 140 The Court placed great weight on the fact that police
officers lack time to make considered decisions and need to take almost instinctive, split-second action. 141 The Court then explained
132. See id. at 836-37.
133. See id. at 837. At a distance so close and with such a high-speed, the officer
would have needed 650 additional feet in order to stop his car. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. The intensity of the impact sprayed Lewis's blood over the entire windshield of the patrol car and ruptured every major organ in his body. See Respondent's Brief at 2, Lewis, 523 U.S. at 833 (No. 96-1337) (citing the officer's
deposition) .
138. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 837.
139. See id. at 84344. The Court rejected any argument that Lewis was seized. See
id.
140. See id. at 842-46. The Court emphasized: "The touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government." Id. at
845 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,558 (1974».
141. See id. at 850-53. The Court distinguished a pursuit situation from a challenge
to a prison official's misconduct under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 851.
In a prison custody situation, the reckless indifference standard would still apply. See id. Under a custody situation, the prison official is responsible for the
welfare of the inmates and has the luxury of considered forethought. See id.
Additionally, there are no countervailing concerns which might excuse a
prison official from taking action for the inmate's welfare. See id. A police officer has none of these luxuries when deciding whether to act. See id. at 85253. This distinction reflects the inability for mechanical application of substantive due process principles.
[A] ttention to the markedly different circumstances of normal pretrial custody and high-speed law enforcement chases shows why the
deliberate indifference that shocks in the one case is less egregious
in the other (even assuming that it makes sense to speak of in differ-

Police Liability in High-Speed Chases

1999]

165

that to make a cognizable claim of executive abuse of power under
the Fourteenth Amendment in a police pursuit situation, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the pursuing officer's actions shock the conscience. 142 The Court held that "high-speed chases with no intent to
harm suspects physically or worsen their legal plight do not give rise
to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action under § 1983."143
Looking to the facts, the Court found that the officer had acted within the bounds of his job as a law enforcement officer.l44 The
officer had not acted with any intent to induce the suspect's lawlessness nor with any intent to terrorize, harm, or kill him.145 Further,
any prudence on the officer's part was subject to the countervailing
demands of law enforcement. 146 Therefore, regardless of whether
the officer had overstepped a tort law standard of reasonableness,
his actions had failed to rise to a level that would shock the
conscience. 147
From the foregoing, it should be apparent that the shocks the
conscience standard leaves little room for recovery where an officer's conduct is challenged under Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. 148 In fact, the shocks the conscience test exists
ence as deliberate in the case of sudden pursuit).
[d. at 851.

142. See id. at 846. As to the fluidity of the shocks the conscience standard, the
Court noted: "While the measure of what is conscience-shocking is no calibrated yard stick, it does, as Judge Friendly put it, 'point the way.'" [d. at 847
(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973».
143. [d. at 854.
144. See id. at 855.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. This point clarifies the positIon of the Court that the Fourteenth
Amendment is not a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the states." [d. at 847 (quoting Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976». Similarly, this point also reaffirms another
earlier statement by the Court that "'[o]ur constitution [sic] deals with the
large concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to
supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society.'" [d. (quoting Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986».
148. Since Lewis, there have been several federal circuit court opinions applying
the shocks the conscience standard to challenges to a police officer's actions.
See, e.g., Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that an officer who inadvertently shot the wrong man during a
gunfight did not violate substantive due process); Schaefer v. Goch, 153 F.3d
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mainly to preserve the Fourteenth Amendment for extremely egregious and flagrant abuses of governmental authority.149 Therefore,
state law becomes the primary vehicle to impose liability on a police
officer's conduct that fails to shock the conscience. 150

IV. POLICE LIABILITY IN MARYLAND
To assess an officer's conduct for potential liability under Maryland law, an attorney must understand the interplay of common-law
principles and the statutory regime. In Maryland, the government
and its employees are protected by sovereign immunity,151 a doctrine which bars all suits against the state absent legislative permission. 152 While full immunity has traditionally been granted to the

149.

150.

151.

152.

793, 798-99 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that an officer who unintentionally shot a
crime victim in the course of a botched arrest tailed to evince the requisite
purpose to harm necessary for a substantive due process violation); Rogers v.
City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that an officer
who raped a citizen violated her substantive due process rights); Radecki v.
Barela, 146 F.3d 1227, 1228, 1232 (lOth Cir. 1998) (explaining that there
would be no violation of substantive due process when a citizen assisting an
officer was shot in the struggle with a suspect); Courville v. City of Lake
Charles, 720 So. 2d 789, 802 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an officer who
undertook a high-speed chase through city streets resulting in the death of
the fleeing suspect did not violate substantive due process).
Of the cases decided since Lewis, Rogers provides a graphic example of an officer's conduct that was deemed conscience shocking. See Rogers, 152 F.3d at
796-97. In Rogers, the officer, after pulling the plaintiff over for a minor traffic
stop, followed her home and raped her. See id. at 793-94. The officer remained in uniform throughout the incident. See id. at 794. The court held
that, "[the] rape was an intentional act that produced constitutional injury
and that was an 'arbitrary exercise of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice.'" Id. at 797 (quoting
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (quoting Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (l884))). The court then affirmed a $100,000
damage award against the officer in his personal capacity. See id. at 798.
See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854 n.14. The Lewis Court noted that simply because the
officer's conduct did not rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation does not "imply anything about its appropriate treatment under state
law." Id.
See Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 54-55, 405 A.2d 255, 257 (1979)
("Once venerated, recently vilified, and presently substantially limited, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity has been long recognized by this Court.").
See Godwin v. County Comm'rs of St. Mary's County, 256 Md. 326, 334, 260
A.2d 296, 299 (1970); see also Board of Trustees of Howard Community College v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 583, 366 A.2d 360, 362 (1976) (noting
that a state agency cannot waive immunity, even if the agency fails to plead
it); Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm'n, 264 Md. 471, 474, 287 A.2d 40, 42 (1972).
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State, there has never been an extension of absolute immunity to
the State's counties and municipalities. 153 Originally based on the
ancient common-law premise that "the King can do no wrong,"154
the doctrine of sovereign immunity has recently been modified by
the Maryland General AssemblyI55 to serve the existing public policy
concerns of modern government. 156 This suggests the Legislature's
awareness of the inherent unfairness of leaving those injured at the
hands of state employees without a remedy.157

153.

154.
155.

156.

157.

The Jekofsky court observed: "[I] t is desirable and in the public interest that
any change in the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the legislative branch of the State Government rather than from the judicial
branch." Id. See generally Charles A. Rees, State Constitutional Law for Maryland
Lawyers: Judicial Relief for Violations of Rights, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 102, 122-33
(1980) (discussing the limitations imposed by various governmental and official immunities on judicial review under both federal and Maryland law);
Steven D. Frenkil, Comment, The State as a Party Defendant: Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in Tort in Maryland, 36 MD. L. REv. 653, 654-58 (1977) (explaining the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Maryland).
In the case of counties and municipalities, there is a distinction drawn between governmental and proprietary functions. See Tadjer v. Montgomery
County, 300 Md. 539, 549, 479 A.2d 1321, 1326 (1984) (discussing the need to
discern between a government and proprietary function); Austin, 286 Md. at
63, 405 A.2d at 261 (holding that the city was involved in a governmental
function in the operation of a day camp). A municipality is immune only if it
is performing a governmental function, rather than a proprietary function,
when the individual is allegedly injured. See Austin, 286 Md. at 63, 405 A.2d at
261. To determine whether a function is governmental, one must focus on
whether "the act in question is sanctioned by legislative authority, is solely for
the public benefit, with no profit or emolument inuring to the municipality,
and tends to benefit the public health and promote the welfare of the whole
public, and has in it no element of private interest." Id. at 60, 405 A.2d at 260
(quoting E. Eyring & Sons Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 253 Md. 380, 383, 252
A.2d 824, 824 (1969». Distinguishing between proprietary and governmental
functions can be difficult; as noted by the court of appeals, "[ t] he distinction
between governmental and proprietary functions is sometimes illusory in practice." E. Eyring & Sons Co., 253 Md. at 382, 252 A.2d at 825.
Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507, 397 A.2d
1027, 1030 (1979).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-101 to 12-110 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
These provisions, which provide a broad waiver of the State's tort immunity,
are known generally as the "Maryland Tort Claims Act." Id. § 12-110.
See Frenkil, supra note 152, at 658. There has been a shift to the view that the
doctrine is based on the inappropriateness of diverting public funds for private use. See id. Further, allowing private recovery from the state can place
such a burden on its ability to govern that the larger concerns of the public
will go unanswered. See id. at 658-62.
The Act shall be construed broadly to effectuate the stated purpose, which is
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In relation to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the doctrine
of public official immunity protects a government employee from
individual liability for negligence. 15S To be immune from liability,
the government actor must be a public official and the challenged
conduct must have occurred while the official was performing a discretionary act. 159 Once both of these prongs are satisfied, "a qualified immunity attaches; namely in the absence of malice, the individual involved is free from liability." 160 When analyzing police
pursuit issues in Maryland, an attorney must remember these common-law doctrines, as they provide the underlying framework for
the various statutory enactments that follow.

A.

Maryland Tort Claims Act

The Maryland General Assembly enacted the Maryland Tort
Claims Act l61 with the goal of affording a remedy to individuals injured by tortious conduct attributable to the State. 162 Until its enactment, the State and its various agencies could not be sued without
legislative authorization and an availability of funds. 163 The statute
waives state governmental immunity from tort actions for simple
negligence and provides a statutory cap of $200,000 on such
claims. l64 The challenged conduct must be committed by state per-

158.
159.

160.

161.
162.
163.

164.

"ensur[ing] that injured parties have a remedy." MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T
§ 12-102 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
SeeJames v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 323-24, 418 A.2d 1173, 1178
(1980).
See id. The court set up a two part test: (1) the government actor must be a
"public official rather than a mere government employee," and (2) the challenged conduct must have occurred while "performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial acts." Id.
See Clea v. Mayor of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 673, 541 A.2d 1303, 1308 (1988)
(citing Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 302-04, 396 A.2d
255,260-61 (1979), overruled by, James, 288 Md. at 329-36, 418 A.2d at 1181-84;
Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 342, 34647, 278 A.2d 71, 74
(1971) ).
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T §§ 12-101 to 12-110 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
See id. § 12-102.
See Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 44849, 545 A.2d 1312, 1314-17
(1988). In order for sovereign immunity to be waived, there must be two conditions met: " [f]irst, the General Assembly must authorize suits for damages;
and second, there must be a provision for the payment of judgments." Id. at
455, 545 A.2d at 1317.
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 12-104 (a) (2) (1998). Section (c) of 12-104
allows for the payment of claims exceeding $200,000 if certain conditions are
met. See id. at § 12-104(c).
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sonnel acting within the scope of their official duties for the State's
immunity to be waived}65 If the official's actions either fall outside
the scope of duty or are made with malice or gross negligence, the
State's immunity will not be waived and the state employee can be
held individually liable. 166
This statute balances the interests that are invoked by the debate over liability for injuries suffered during police pursuits. 167 It
creates a broad remedy for injured third parties, while at the same
time providing a safe harbor that relieves state employees of liability
for acts of simple negligence. 168 While the Maryland Tort Claims Act
creates a broad remedy for citizens injured by any state employee's
negligence, a statute set forth in the Transportation Article provides
more specific provisions from which to gauge a police officer's negligent conduct.

B.

Section 19-103 oj the Transportation Article

Section 19-103 of the Transportation Article 169 provides that the
owner or lessee of an emergency vehicle is liable "for any damages
caused by a negligent act or omission of an authorized operator
while operating the emergency vehicle in the performance of emergency service."170 As defined by the statute, emergency service includes "pursuing a violator or a suspected violator of the law." 17l Put
simply, this provision places liability on the owner or lessee of the
emergency vehicle for acts of simple negligence committed by the
driver.172 However, this statute provides that a police officer is individually immune from liability when operating an emergency vehicle in the performance of emergency service. 173 Therefore, even
though this statute provides a remedy that governmental immunity
might otherwise block, it also may be a minefield to erase other avenues of recovery that may be available.

165.
166.
167.
168.

See
See
See
See

id.

Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(b) (1998).
supra notes 1642 and accompanying text.

MD. CODE ANN.,

MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 12-104 (a)-(b) (1998).
169. MD. CODE ANN .. TRANSP. II § 19-103 (1999).
170. Id. § 19-103(c).
171. Id. § 19-103(a)(3)(ii).
172. See id. § 19-103(c) (providing for liability to the extent afforded by MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-639 (1998».
173. See id. § 19-103 (b).

170
V.

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 29

PRACTICAL STRATEGIES IN DECISION-MAKING

Litigating an officer's personal liability for various acts or omissions in the scope of official duties can be a daunting task. Tying all
of these provisions together can be tricky. Each cause of action has
a different result depending on who is chosen as a defendant-the
police officer or the municipality. Based on an officer's common-law
duty of due care owed to others on the roadway, the Maryland police officer owes a tort duty of care to a plaintiff injured by a suspected criminal if the officer "place [s a citizen] within a 'zone of
danger without reasonable justification,' and set[s] in motion a
chain of events which [he] knew or should have known would lead
to ... injur[y]."174 When assessing the officer's actions to determine
a breach of duty, an attorney must consider a number of factors including road conditions, amount of traffic in the area, pedestrian
traffic, time of day, weather conditions, gravity of the offense the
suspect allegedly committed, and the spontaneous nature of the officer's judgment. 175 Moreover, the officer's judgment should be
viewed in light of what a reasonable officer at the scene would have
faced without the benefit of hindsight. 176 Where an injury to a bystander is at issue, plaintiff's counsel must state with specificity all
allegations of negligence which proximately caused a client's
harm.m Once an attorney finds that a duty was in fact owed and
states the allegations of breach, the next step is to consider the effect of the common-law doctrines and statutes. 178
174. Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 586, 594 A.2d 121, 135 (1991) (grappling with
multiple claims arising from the death of a couple killed when struck by a
fleeing suspect's vehicle) (quoting Keesling v. State, 288 Md. 579, 589, 591,
420 A.2d 261, 266-67 (1980». In Boyer, the Court of Appeals of Maryland extended the scope of an officer's common-law duty of care to cover both those
directly involved with the officer and innocent bystanders. Seeid. at 584-85,
594 A.2d at 134-35.
175. As a case of first impression, the Boyer court in dictum suggested these factors
be taken into account when assessing the new-found duty. See id. at 590, 594
A.2d at 137. Further, the court suggested particular aggravating circumstances: (1) violation of police department policies or guidelines; (2) failure
to turn on warning devices; and (3) extremely high-speeds in congested areas.
See id. at 591, 594 A.2d at 137.
176. See id. at 587-89, 594 A.2d at 136-37 (recognizing that an officer's conduct
should be judged not by hindsight, but "in light of how a reasonable officer
would respond faced with the same difficult emergency situation").
177. See id. at 589 n.20, 594 A.2d at 136 n.20.
178. See discussion supra Part III; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5639( e) (1998).
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Under Maryland law, the officer is granted governmental immunity from a personal liability suit for simple negligence. 179 This is
in part because, as noted by the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland:
[A]n employee of the Maryland State Police, sworn as a police officer, is for police powers on duty twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week, fIfty-two weeks a year, and where he
acts as a law enforcement officer, he is under the protection of the Maryland Tort Claims Act.180
To pierce the limited immunity provided by the Maryland Tort
Claims Act and hold the officer individually liable, the officer's actions must be malicious or sufficiently wanton and reckless to constitute gross negligence. 181 However, vaguely pleading malice or
gross negligence is insufficient to remove the protective umbrella of
immunity from the actions of a police officer; the plaintiff must
make a strong showing of facts evincing wanton or reckless
behavior. 182
There are also situations in which the doctrine of public official
immunity will bar any recovery from an officer individually.183 If an
officer is acting in a discretionary manner and chooses not to apprehend a fleeing suspect, the officer is generally immune from suit
if the suspect proceeds to injure others.184 In such situations, the offIcer owes no tort duty of care to third persons. 185 Looking beyond
an officer's individual liability, however, situations are likely to arise
179. See supra Part lILA. While the officer may be immune, the state can still be
held liable to a certain extent. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
180. Sawyer v. Humphries, 82 Md. App. 72, 83-84, 570 A.2d 341, 347' (1990), rev'd on
other grounds, 322 Md. 247, 587 A.2d 467 (1991).
181. See Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 578-79, 594 A.2d 121, 131-32 (1991). According
to the Buyer court: "In order to charge Trooper Titus with gross negligence,
the plaintiffs must have pled facts showing that Trooper Titus acted with a
wanton and reckless disregard for others in pursuing . . . . " Id. at 579, 594
A.2d at 132.
182. See Humphries, 82 Md. App. at 86, 570 A.2d at 348; see also Buyer, 323 Md. at
580, 594 A.2d at 132. The plaintiffs in Buyer alleged that the trooper drove at a
high rate of speed in a congested area, failed to immediately activate emergency equipment, and violated police procedures. See Buyer, 323 Md. at 580,
594 A.2d at 132. The court concluded that, "these somewhat vague allegations
do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence." Id.
183. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
184. See Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 626-35, 510 A.2d 1078,
1081 (1986).
185. See id.
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where an attorney can attempt to hold local municipalities liable for
the actions of their officers.
Under Maryland law, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are constitutional officers subject to the control of the Maryland General Assembly.186 As constitutional officers some of their actions are performed as state government employees. 187 Furthermore, county
agencies are generally not liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior for tortious acts committed by these state employees. 188 Accordingly, an attempt to hold a municipality or local government
unit liable as an employer under the Maryland Tort Claims Act l89
for the actions of a sheriff or deputy will not always suffice. l90
However, all is not lost. If an attorney alleges that the municipality owns the police vehicle driven by the sheriff or deputy sheriff,
then a claim might be viable. 191 If the sheriff or deputy sheriff was
negligent in the operation of that vehicle, then a claim under section 19-103,192 although immunizing the officer from liability, would
allow for recovery against the municipality based on ownership of
the emergency vehicle. 193 Mter the municipality, the next foreseeable defendant is the state government under the Maryland Tort

186. See CONST. OF MD., DECL. RTS., art. IV, § 44 (providing that the sheriff shall
"exercise such powers and perform such duties as now are or may hereafter
be fIxed by law"). According to the court of appeals, "the ... Constitution,
which mentions the office, and provides for fIlling it, does not specify or describe the powers or duties of the sheriff. These are left to the common law
and the acts of the assembly." Beasly v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641, 655, 52 A. 61, 64
(1902) (quoting Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376,488 (1860».
187. See Prince George's County, Md. v. Aluisi, 354 Md. 422, 439, 731 A.2d 888, 895
(1999); Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275, 281, 558 A.2d 399, 402
(1989), superseded l7y statute as stated in, State v. Card, 104 Md. App. 439, 656
A.2d 400 (1995).
188. See Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 572-73, 594 A.2d 121, 128 (1991); if. Ritchie v.
Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 357, 597 A.2d 432, 438 (1991) (explaining that "while,
under Maryland law, a sheriff is a state official, the ... classifIcation is not dispositive for purposes of § 1983" of the Civil Rights Act).
189. See supra Part lILA.
190. See Boyer, 323 Md. at 572-73, 594 A.2d at 128.
191. See id. at 575-76, 594 A.2d at 130. It is important to note that local governments have waived their immunity from torts committed by their employees
in a statutory enactment similar to the Maryland Torts Claim Act. See MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. §§ 5-301 to 5-304 (1998) (containing the provisions of the Local Government Tort Claims Act).
192. See supra Part III.B.
193. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 19-103(c)(I) (1999).
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Claims Act. 194
Regardless of whether the officer is protected by public official
immunity for discretionary acts, if the officer acted negligently and
if the officer is a government employee, the state government can
be liable because it has waived its immunity under the Maryland
Torts Claims ACt. 195 Strategy is important if an argument is made
that the officer's actions were grossly negligent, then the limited
waiver of state immunity granted under the statute will be forever
lost. 196
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis
limits the attractiveness of the Fourteenth Amendment as a potential avenue of recovery for injuries sustained as a result of a highspeed chase. 197 The result in Lewis suggests that only state legislative
and political processes can provide a more conducive remedy for injured citizens at the state level. l98
To a limited extent, the Maryland Tort Claims Act provides the
middle ground between competing policy goals protecting an officer with immunity for simple negligence, while waiving the state's
sovereign immunity.l99 The Maryland General Assembly has the discretion to lower the bar and provide less police immunity depending on local community needs. 2°O A proper exercise of this discre194. See supra Part IVA
195. See James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 329-32, 418 A.2d 1173, 118182 (1980).
196. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text; see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE
Gov'T § 12-104(b) (1999). Section 12-104(b) states that immunity is not
waived in those instances described in section 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. See id. Section 5-522(a) in pertinent part provides:
"Immunity of the state is not waived under section 12-104 of the State Government Article for: . . . (4) [a]ny tortious act or omission of State personnel
that: (i) [i]s not within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel;
or (ii) [i]s made with malice or gross negligence." MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &
JUD. PROC. § 5-522 (1998).
197. See discussion supra Part II.D.
198. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
199. See discussion supra Part IlIA.
200. See discussion supra Part III. In the 1998 session, the Maryland Legislature
adopted changes to the penalty for fleeing or eluding a police officer. See
1998 Md. Laws 649. These changes increase the fine from $3,000 to $5,000 in
the case of bodily injury to another, and raise the maximum penalty if a
death occurs from 5 years of imprisonment to 10 years. See MD. CODE ANN.,
TRANSP. II § 27-101 (p) (2)-(3) (1999). Perhaps an even harsher penalty will
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tion will strive to reach equipose between the competing interests of
the pro-police and those who advocate greater protection for the
public. 201
Roger K Picker

make an offender think twice before fleeing from the police.
201. See supra Part I.B.

